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(5500 words) 
Imagine you are Ulysses. You know that the songs of the Sirens are extremely beautiful 
as well as dangerously seductive, failure to resist the temptation to join the Sirens being 
likely to prove fatal. Suppose that by contrast to the original story, you fail to get tied to 
the mast – you fail to bind yourself, to use Jon Elster’s expression (1977). Is it possible 
that in spite of your better judgment, you jump overboard to follow the Sirens? Suppose 
that it is freely and intentionally that you jump into the sea. You act freely in the sense 
that nothing forces you to act the way you do – it is not because you are pushed 
overboard by a gust of wind or compelled by a compulsive urge that you jump. And your 
action is intentional – for instance, you do not jump because you trip over a loose rope or 
because you are so confused as to think that jumping into the sea is the best way to 
escape the Sirens. Can it really be the case that at the same time as you jump, you really 
judge that you have decisive reasons not to join the Sirens, or that all things considered, it 
would be better – decisively better, in this instance – not to do so? 
Such actions, which have been called “akratic” (from akrasia, which means lack 
of mastery in Greek) but also “incontinent” (from the Latin incontinentia) and “weak-
willed”, can be characterized roughly as actions performed in spite of the agent’s better 
judgment. A question that has been at the center of recent philosophical debates is 
whether such actions are possible. This debate can be traced back to Socrates, Plato and 
Aristotle. Initially conceived of as a problem belonging to ethics, the question addressed 
being whether and, if so, how an agent could yield to temptation in spite of his knowing 
that this was bad, the recent debate concerns our general understanding of how actions 
are related to practical judgment. Even though everyone in the debate would agree that 
akratic actions appear to be a commonly recognized phenomenon, it is only in the wake 
of Donald Davidson’s influential paper, “How is Weakness of the Will Possible?” 
(Davidson 1970), that philosophers have come to accept the possibility of akratic actions. 
As we shall see the question remains controversial. 
The question of the possibility of akratic actions obviously depends on how such 
actions are characterized, and it is no surprise that very different conceptions of akratic 
actions have been proposed. One difficulty in understanding recent debates is that, as I 
indicated, many terms been used to refer to akratic actions, but moreover quite different 
phenomena have been distinguished. For example, Richard Holton (1999; 2009) proposes 
to distinguish between akrasia and weakness of will, where the former relates to acting in 
spite of one’s better judgment, and the latter is defined in terms of irrational 
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reconsideration of the agent’s resolution. So it is important to clarify whether the 
disagreement is about how to describe what is supposed to be one and the same 
phenomenon, or whether the discussion is about a number of different and possibly only 
loosely related phenomena. 
In spite of the important variety of available accounts, what is commonly assumed 
is that akrasia is opposed to self-control, akratic actions often being thought to instantiate 
a paradigmatic self-control failure. Weakness of will understood as irrational resolution 
reconsideration also counts as a paradigmatic self-control failure. As such, that both 
akrasia and weakness of will are considered to be opposed to self-control is not a 
problem. Akrasia and weakness of will could well constitute two kinds of self-control 
failures, along with addiction and compulsion. The question that is raised, however, is 
that of the nature of self-control. Is self-control one unified phenomenon, or are there 
several distinct phenomena? Moreover, a puzzle arises here. If we suppose that akrasia is 
opposed to self-control, the question is how akratic actions could be free and intentional. 
After all, it would seem that it is only if an action manifests self-control that it can count 
as free. 
 My plan is to explore the relation between akrasia and self-control. The first 
section presents what I shall call the standard conception, according to which akrasia and 
self-control are contraries, and introduces the puzzle that this conception raises. The 
second section turns to the arguments for and against the possibility of free and 
intentional akratic actions. The third section questions the claim that akratic actions are 
necessarily opposed to actions manifesting self-control. 
 
1. The standard conception 
The contemporary debate around akrasia is largely based on Aristotle’s seminal account. 
According to Aristotle, enkrateia and akrasia, along with virtue and vice, are character 
traits (Nicomachean Ethics, VII). Enkrateia, which literally means mastery and is often 
translated by “continence”, but also by “self-control”, is not as praiseworthy as virtue. 
This is so because by contrast to the virtuous agent, the enkratic agent experiences 
passions such as anger or exaggerated appetites for pleasure, which are contrary to 
reason. What characterizes the enkratic agent is that he manages to resist these 
temptations. As a result, the enkratic agent generally does what a virtuous agent would in 
similar circumstances. Similarly, akrasia, which literally means lack of mastery, is not as 
blameworthy as vice. The akratic agent not only experiences the same wayward passions 
as the enkratic agent, but he also yield to these passions. By contrast to the vicious agent, 
however, the akratic agent has knowledge of the right action. Interestingly, the 
knowledge attributed to the akratic agent is not unqualified. The akratic agent has 
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knowledge, but he is not exercising or using it, like someone who is asleep, mad, or 
drunk (Nicomachean Ethics, VII, 1147a10-24; see Kraut 2008; Müller 2015).  
By failing to attribute full-blown knowledge of the akratic agent, Aristotle appears 
to deny the possibility of “clear-eyed akrasia” (Charlton 1988: chap. 3). Aristotle thus 
comes close to the Socratic thesis, according to which it is not possible to act against 
one’s knowledge of the right, a thesis that Aristotle in fact criticizes as going against the 
appearances. More specifically, Socrates is said to have denied the possibility of 
voluntary action performed in spite of knowing that what is done is bad or less than the 
best: “(…) no one (…) acts against what he believes best – people act so only by reason 
of ignorance” (Nicomachean Ethics, VII, 1145b25-30). A similar denial can be found in 
Plato: “No one who either knows or believes that there is another possible course of 
action better than the one he is following, will ever continue on his present course.” 
(Protagoras 358b-c)  
 Even though only a few contemporary thinkers would be tempted by the claim 
that there is no akrasia in any sense similar to what Socrates had in mind, the basic 
opposition between akrasia and self-control is widely accepted (see Davidson 1970; Levy 
2011). Here is for instance how Alfred Mele states this view: “I will follow Aristotle in 
understanding self-control and akrasia as two sides of the same coin. […] Self-controlled 
individuals are agents who have significant motivation to conduct themselves as they 
judge best and a robust capacity to do what it takes so to conduct themselves in the face 
of (actual or anticipated) motivation […]. Akratic individuals, conversely, suffer from a 
deficiency in one or both of these connections.” (2002: 531; see also 1992; 1995)  
These claims concern akrasia as an attribute of agents. Contemporary discussions 
have rather focused on types of actions. Mele specifies what he calls “strict incontinent 
actions” in the following way:  
An action A is a strict incontinent action if and only if it is performed 
intentionally and freely and, at the time at which it is performed, its agent 
consciously holds a judgment to the effect that there is good and sufficient reason 
for his not performing an A at that time. (1992: 7; 2012; see also Davidson 1970: 
22) 
According to this definition, strict akratic actions are freely and intentionally performed 
in spite of the agent’s better judgment, where the better judgment is characterized in 
terms of good and sufficient reasons – what appear to be decisive reasons – and where the 
conflict is specified as being synchronic instead of involving a diachronic change of 
mind. 
Mele argues that such actions are perfectly possible. However, if we assume that 
free akratic actions are possible, and if we assume that akrasia is opposed to self-control, 
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it follows that actions manifesting lack of self-control can be free. This might seem not 
much of a problem, but on reflection the idea that freedom and self-control can come 
apart is puzzling. As many would agree, free agency requires self-control. Intuitively, an 
agent is free only if she is in control of what she does. Robert Kane, for one, starts his 
contribution to Four Views of Free Will as follows: “The problem of free will has arisen 
in history whenever people have been led to suspect that their actions might be 
determined or necessitated by factors unknown to them and beyond their control.” (Kane 
2007: 5). Someone who is under the control of another agent is as unfree as a marionette 
pulled by strings. Similarly, it appears that an agent is only free if she is in control of 
what she thinks and desires. If what an agent wants is controlled by someone else, as 
when the person is under hypnosis, the agent is just as unfree as the marionette in the 
hands of the puppeteer. So, self-control clearly appears necessary to free agency.  
One way to come to see that there is a puzzle is to focus on the notion of free 
agency. As Gary Watson underlined in his influential article “Free Will and Free Action”, 
the notion of free agency involves two different features that both need to be captured, 
self-determination (or autonomy) and the availability of alternative possibilities (Watson 
1987: 145). Now even if self-control and autonomy, understood as the capacity to govern 
oneself, might well be different concepts, they clearly appear closely connected. It is 
unclear how one could govern oneself without also controlling oneself. Indeed, self-
control is often thought to be essential to autonomy. Here is how Marina Oshana 
formulates this assumption: “Autonomous persons are beings in actual control of their 
own choices, actions, and goals. […] Implicit in the idea of actual control over one’s life 
is the idea of self-control.” (Oshana 2006: 3) 
 Now, the problem is that if free agency requires self-control, then it would seem 
that free agency excludes lack of self-control. Put differently, in so far as an action is 
free, it cannot be one that manifests lack of self-control. But this makes for a problem if 
one accepts that there are strict akratic actions. This puzzle can be expressed in the form 
of a paradox: 
1) Self-control excludes akrasia. 
2) Akratic actions can be free. 
3) Free agency requires self-control. 
 
There are at least as many ways to solve this puzzle as there are propositions. You can 
question whether self-control excludes akrasia, whether akratic actions can be free, and 
whether free agency requires self-control. I shall assume that given a reasonable 
understanding of free agency and self-control, free agency requires self-control. Instead, I 
want to focus on the two other propositions making up the paradox, starting with the 
second one.  
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Before I do so, let me note that a similar paradox involves the notion of 
autonomy. In a nutshell, the problem is that it seems plausible that autonomy requires 
self-control, and yet there is reason to think that actions that are characterized by a lack of 
self-control, such as akratic actions, can be autonomous, given that they can be free. The 
question that is raise is whether akratic actions can be autonomous (Mele 1995: 194, fn. 
11; 2002). 
Also, let me also pause to mark the distance between contemporary discussions 
and Aristotle’s conception. Put simply, no such paradox arises for Aristotle. First, 
Aristotle was thinking in terms of voluntariness and not in terms of the modern notion of 
free agency. Even so, a similar puzzle could be spelled out by tying voluntariness to self-
control. But second, and more importantly, neither our puzzle nor its ancient equivalent 
would have been a problem for Aristotle. This is so because Aristotle presumably would 
have just as many qualms about the possibility of strict akrasia as he has about voluntary 
actions that conflict with full-blown knowledge. 
 
2. The possibility of strict akrasia2 
In a striking passage, Sarah Broadie claims “we all know that [incontinence] often 
happens; thus we know that it can happen” (1991: 266). As I said, she is far from alone in 
accepting the possibility of free akratic actions, a majority of contemporary philosophers 
being in agreement on this point (Bratman 1979; Audi 1979; Broadie 1991; Smith 1994; 
McIntyre 1990; 2006; Holton 1999; 2009; Arpaly 2000; Kennett 2001; Searle 2001; 
Stroud 2003; 2008; Henden 2004; Dodd 2009). Compared with how akrasia has been 
conceived in the history of philosophy since Socrates, there thus has been a radical shift 
(but see Hare 1952; Davidson 1970; Watson 1977; Buss 1997; Tenenbaum 1999; 2003; 
2007; Levy 2011 for the view that strict akrasia is impossible). So, what are the 
arguments for and against the possibility of strict akrasia? 
 On the face of it, free and intentional action performed in spite of the judgment 
that one has sufficient reasons not to perform that action, where that judgment is 
contemporaneous to the action, seems perfectly possible. First, there is no blatant 
contradiction in the definition of strict akratic actions. Indeed, it seems easy enough to 
imagine cases satisfying the definition. Is it not possible that Ulysses jumps into the sea 
to join the Sirens even though exactly at the same time, he judges that he has sufficient 
reasons not to do so? Or if you find this example far-fetched, is it not possible that Sarah 
judges that she has sufficient reasons not to have a third chocolate mousse while, freely 
and intentionally, Sarah nonetheless goes for it? Such possibilities are hard to deny. 
Finally, a further reason to accept the possibility of strict akratic actions comes from the 
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fact that we consider agents to be responsible for their akratic actions. This suggests that 
we consider the actions to be free, for it is plausible to assume that actions for which we 
hold someone morally responsible are free actions. It would appear unfair to consider 
someone to be responsible for an action caused by an irresistible urge, for instance. At 
most, we could consider that person to be responsible for not having developed the 
required self-control capacities, but this is a distinct failure. 
Of course, appearances might be misleading. Maybe these descriptions are 
inaccurate. How could it be excluded that Ulysses in a sense knows that joining the 
Sirens is too risky, but that there is something wrong with that cognition (Tenenbaum 
2007)? Or else, Ulysses might have undergone a possibly irrational change of mind, the 
songs of the Sirens causing him to revise his evaluation of the situation (Ainslie 1975; 
1992; Elster 1979; Jackson 1984)? Ulysses might even have resolved not to yield to the 
seduction of the Sirens, but again, their songs make him revise his resolution (Holton 
1999; Dodd 2009). Similarly how could it be excluded that Sarah does not actually judge 
but merely believe in a dispositional sense that she should not have this chocolate mousse 
(Levy 2011)? Maybe Sarah only judges that she should reduce her calorie intake overall, 
where this goal is so vague as to be compatible with judging you should ingest any 
particular desert (Tenenbaum and Raffman 2012; Andreou 2014). (For yet other 
possibilities, such as hypocrisy, confusion, mention of a purely conventional norm, etc., 
see Hare 1992.) 
 But then, maybe not. It could well be that these alternative descriptions 
correspond to possible variations of our two cases, but that at the time they fail to 
accurately describe Ulysses and Sarah. So it might seem that what we have is a mere 
clash of intuitions, where little can be done to move forward. Yet, I believe that this 
conclusion misrepresents the dialectic. What has to be underlined is that strict akrasia 
appears perfectly possible, and so what is needed to deny its possibility is sufficient 
reason to believe that appearances are misleading. Giving such a reason is exactly what 
philosophers from Socrates onwards have attempted to do. They have lined up a number 
of arguments to show that strict akrasia is not possible. Let us look at the main 
arguments. As far as I can see, four of them can be distinguished. 
The first argument against the possibility of strict akrasia appeals to an attractive 
conception of intentional action, according to which intentional action is done in the light 
of some imagined good (Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics, I; Aquinas Summa Theologica, 
1rst Part of the 2
nd
 Part, question 1; Anscombe 1957; Davidson 1970). Obviously, this 
conception and the ensuing argument could just as well be expressed in terms of 
sufficient reasons. On this conception, an agent who intentionally acts sets a positive 
value on some end, and given his belief that an action of the kind he can perform will 
realize the valued end, he acts. More precisely, an action will count as intentional only if 
the agent judges that it is best for him to perform that action (Davidson 1970: 23). If we 
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further suppose that an action needs to be intentional for it to be free, it follows that 
actions that conflict with what the agent judges best cannot be free. Thus, in so far as 
akratic actions are not in the guise of the good, they cannot be free. 
 In response, it can be denied that intentional actions have to be done in the guise 
of the good (Stocker 1979; Velleman 1992). For instance, as David Velleman underlines, 
Satan seems an example of an agent who intentionally pursues the bad (Velleman 1992: 
18) Be that as it may, it is not necessary to deny that intentional action is performed in the 
guise of the good in order to make room for strict akrasia. The assumption in the above 
argument that should come under scrutiny is that acting in the light of the good requires 
making a judgment. To make this assumption is to overlook a number of plausible 
alternatives. The mere fact that an action is caused by a desire might be sufficient for the 
considering that the action is done in the light of the good. Indeed, desires have been 
considered to be perceptions of the good (Stampe 1987; Oddie 2005; Tenenbaum 2007). 
Another possibility is to suggest that acting on the basis of emotions can, at least in 
certain conditions, be seen as acting in the light of the good (Jones 2003; Tappolet 2003; 
forthcoming). 
A related argument has been offered by Sarah Buss (1997). The argument turns on 
role of preferences in intentional actions. It is based on the plausible idea that someone 
who acts a certain way while she would prefer to act otherwise does not act freely and 
intentionally. Thus, it seems impossible to force an agent to do something intentionally 
when she prefers not to do it. At best, it is possible to modify her preferences by using 
threats. In Buss own words: “[…] since no one can be compelled to set a particular goal 
for herself as long as she prefers to pursue a different goal instead, no one can be 
compelled to intend to do one thing as long as she prefers to do another.” (1997: 18) If 
we further assume that to prefer doing something amounts to judging that it would be 
better, all things considered, to do this thing, or else to judge that one has more reasons to 
do it, it follows that the agent who acts against her better judgment does not act freely and 
intentionally. 
The question, obviously, is whether it is justified to take the relation between 
preferences and better judgments to be this close. The question of what kind of mental 
states preferences are is controversial (Hausman 2012). In any case, there is surely room 
for the view that preferences and better judgments can come apart. Preferences might be 
understood in purely behavioral terms, for instance. Even if we take the preferences at 
stake to be psychological states, however, there is room for the claim that only 
appropriate preferences are correlated to better judgments. On this account, to judge that 
something is better than something else, all things considered, would be to judge that it 
would be fitting or appropriate, in the relevant sense, to prefer the former to the latter (for 
such accounts, see Brentano 1889; Scanlon 1998, inter alia). 
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The third argument I would like to consider is also closely connected to the 
conception of intentional action as being done in the guise of the good. It is based on 
considerations bearing on the nature of the judgments that are involved in akratic actions. 
The intuition that is invoked is that such judgments, whatever their exact content, are not 
theoretical, but practical. Such judgments do not merely describe what is the case 
concerning our practical reasons, but tell us what to do, and motivate us accordingly. 
According to this conception, there is a necessary or internal tie between better 
judgments, on the one hand, and motivation and action, on the other. 
 Richard Hare (1952), a proponent of a radical version of internalism with respect 
to moral judgments, claimed that to account for the action-guidingness of moral 
judgments, one has to adopt noncognitivism and suppose that such judgments involve 
imperatives, which we address to ourselves. When you assent to the judgment that you 
ought to tell the truth, you order yourself to do so. And given this, Hare thought it would 
follow that you will indeed tell the truth, if you are free to do so. Thus, it would be 
impossible for an agent to freely fail to do something while judging that she ought to do 
this. If the agent fails to act according to such a judgment, it must be because she was 
physically or psychologically unable to do so. Or else, the agent in fact did not really 
make the judgment in question. Hare’s views, and more particularly his noncognitivism 
about moral judgments, are highly problematic. However, it is not necessary to embrace 
noncognitivism in order to defend internalism about practical judgments. One can simply 
claim that there is an internal relation between better judgments, whatever their exact 
nature, on the one hand, and motivation and action, on the other. Thus, one can hold with 
Davidson that if an agent judges that an action x is better than another action y, she will 
be more motivated to do x than to do y, and if she is free to do x, she will do x, if she 
does either x or y (Davidson 1970: 23) As we have seen, the akratic agent judges that 
what she does not do is better. According to principle we are considering, if the agent 
makes such a judgment and is free to act accordingly, she will act accordingly, if she acts 
at all. If not, then she was not free to do so. 
 What should we think of this principle? We can agree that it is necessary to 
establish a distinction between theoretical judgments, which simply aim at describing 
reality, and practical judgments, which are in some way internally connected to 
motivation and action. However, as has been underlined by Sarah Stroud (2003), the 
distinction between these two kinds of judgments can be maintained without ruling out 
strict akrasia. Following Michael Smith (1994), it is possible to develop a weaker form of 
internalism with respect to moral, and more generally, with respect to practical 
judgments. Smith proposes that if an agent judges that she has to perform an action, 
either she will be motivated to act accordingly, or else she suffers from practical 
irrationality. In so far as this weaker principle establishes a tight connection between 
practical judgments and motivation or action, it preserves the distinction between 
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practical and theoretical judgments. But of course, this new principle is perfectly 
compatible with the possibility of strict akratic actions. What it entails is simply that such 
actions are practically irrational, something which is hardly controversial. Even those 
who claim that it is sometimes more rational to act against one’s better judgment agree 
that some irrationality is involved (Audi 1990; McIntyre 1990; Arpaly 2000; Brunero 
2013). 
The last argument against the possibility of strict akratic actions I shall discuss 
directly questions the claim that akratic can be free. According to Gary Watson (1977), it 
is not possible to distinguish between akratic and compulsive actions in terms of 
freedom: neither of them could have acted otherwise. Watson asks what explains that the 
agent fails to resist the temptation. He discusses two explanations, both of which he 
considers to be unsatisfactory. According to the first explanation, the agent does not resist 
the temptation because he chooses not to resist. Watson claims that we cannot assume 
this, for “to choose not to implement this choice would be to change [the] original 
judgment” (1977: 55). Thus, what we would have is a case of recklessness, not a case of 
akrasia. The second explanation is that the effort to resist the temptation is culpably 
insufficient. If we suppose that the action is free, we have to assume that the agent could 
have made a sufficient effort. Hence, the question is why the agent did not make this 
effort. Again, one cannot say that the agent did not make the relevant effort because he 
thought the effort was not worth it, for that would indicate that the agent had changed his 
mind. Moreover, one cannot say that the agent was mistaken about the effort required, for 
this would be a different fault from that of akrasia.  
The intuition driving Watson’s argument is that choice, and hence free action, 
follows better judgment. This is a conception of action which ties together free agency 
and autonomy, and sees free action as flowing from the agent’s evaluative capacities. 
What free action requires is controversial, but the force of the conception Watson is 
proposing should not be underestimated. Before putting aside Watson’s argument, we 
would need a plausible alternative to the account of free agency he proposes. The fact is 
that there a number of alternatives. According to one such alternative, free agency is 
explained in terms of the exercise of a rational capacity. The difference between the weak 
agent and the compulsive agent is that the latter has, but fails to exercise, the rational 
capacity to bring her desires into line with her better judgment, while the latter lacks this 
capacity (see Smith 2003). In any case, what has to be underlined is that there are 
accounts according to which choice and free action need not follow from judgments 
regarding the good or regarding reasons. 
Let us take a step back. There appear to be no conclusive arguments against the 
possibility of strict akratic actions. In fact, what transpires from the discussion is that the 
objections to that possibility rely on a number of quite theoretical and controversial 
claims regarding human agency. Given the initial plausibility of the possibility of strict 
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akrasia, it is far from clear that they should convince us. In any case, it would seem that 
to solve the puzzle we started with we need to reconsider the standard conception, 
according to which akrasia and self-control are opposite. 
 
3. Akrasia and self-control 
As I said, the claim that akratic actions cannot by definition be actions that manifest self-
control is standardly accepted. But on reflection, this is far from obvious. By all accounts 
the notion of self-control is a relational one. The basic notion is that of the self being in 
control of something else – her actions, her thoughts, her feelings, or more generally and 
also somewhat more mysteriously, of her own self. By contrast, the concept of actions 
freely and intentionally performed against the agent’s better judgment does not, as such, 
involve the idea of the self. What needs to be added to arrive at the idea of a self-control 
failure is the further thought that better judgments represent the self. In Aristotelian 
terms, if the self is the faculty of reason, acting against the verdict of reason, acting 
against this verdict constitutes a self-control failure. According to Aristotle, “reason more 
than anything else is man.” (Nicomachean Ethics, 1178a; also see Plato, Republic, 588b-
592b; Watson 1975). The question is whether we should accept this conception of 
agency.  
A first problem to consider, however, is that it is plausible to distinguish different 
notions of self-control. In an often quoted passage, John L. Austin offers a counter-
example to the view that acting against one’s better judgment necessarily comes with loss 
of self-control. 
Plato, I suppose, and after him Aristotle, fastened this confusion upon us […]. I 
am very partial to ice cream, and a bombe is served divided into segments 
corresponding one to one with the persons at High Table: I am tempted to help 
myself to two segments and do so, thus succumbing to temptation and even 
conceivably (but why necessarily?) going against my principles. But do I lose 
control of myself? Do I raven, do I snatch the morsel from the dish and wolf them 
down, impervious to the consternation of my colleagues? Not a bit of it. We often 
succumb to temptation with calm and even with finesse. (1970: 198 fn. 1) 
A plausible move to account for such examples is to distinguish between different 
capacities. Thus, Jeannette Kennett (2013) proposes to distinguish between intentional 
self-control and normative self-control (see also Kennett 2001; Mele 2002; Schroeter 
2004; Henden 2008). Accordingly, the agent helping himself to two bombe segments can 
be said to have intentional control over his action, in the sense that his action manifests 
his capacity to bring his action in line with his intention. However, that action would fail 
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to manifest normative self-control, understood as the capacity to bring one’s actions into 
line with one’s self. 
A second type of cases cannot be dealt with in this way. Consider the often 
discussed example of Huckleberry Finn (Bennett 1974). As the case is construed by 
Alison McIntyre, Huck fails to turn Jim in to the slave hunters in spite of his judgment 
that all things considered, he ought to do so. Now it seems plausible to say that Huck’s 
decision not to turn Jim in is morally more admirable, which makes it a case of so-called 
“inverse akrasia” (Arpaly and Schroeder 1999). But what matters here is that Huck’s 
decision appears both more rational and, in particular, more responsive to reasons 
compared to the decision to act on his better judgment (Audi 1990; McIntyre 1993; 
Arpaly 2000; Jones 2003; Tappolet 2003; Brunero 2013). In particular, it is more reason-
responsive because his better judgment allegedly neglects important considerations, such 
as Jim’s being his friend, Jim’s desire for freedom, etc. Now, it seems that it is Huck’s 
emotions – his feeling of friendship and his sympathy for Jim – that lead him to disregard 
his doubtful moral principles. Huck’s emotions thus appear to enable him to be properly 
reason-responsive, and more so than if he had acted on his better judgment (Jones 2003; 
Tappolet 2003, forthcoming).  
If this is on the right lines, what we have here is an action freely and intentionally 
performed against the agent’s better judgment that nonetheless manifests the capacity to 
bring one’s action into line with the agent’s self. We would have an akratic action that 
also manifests normative self-control. This is so, at least, if we assume that normative 
self-control requires reason-responsiveness (Kennett 2001; Henden 2008). The claim is 
that normative self-control, which constitutes us as autonomous, self-governed agents, is 
the capacity to govern oneself according to one’s reasons. The assumption that normative 
self-control requires reason-responsiveness rests on a conception of the self that would 
need to be examined. But its initial plausibility makes it reasonable to suggest that akrasia 
need not be opposed to normative self-control. 
 
Conclusion 
Let us look back at the puzzle we started with. The problem was that if we assume that 
free agency requires self-control, so that free actions are actions that manifest self-
control, the possibility of strict akratic actions is ruled out. As we have seen, the three 
following claims are inconsistent:  
1) Self-control excludes akrasia. 
2) Akratic actions can be free. 
3) Free agency requires self-control. 
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I have argued that the solution to the paradox is to reject the first proposition. Not only 
can there be actions performed against the agent’s better judgment which manifest 
intentional self-control, but there can be actions performed against the agent’s better 
judgment which manifest normative self-control, the very form of self-control which has 
commonly been thought to be opposed to akrasia. In a nutshell, pace Aristotle, akrasia 
does not exclude enkrateia. 
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Free will's connection with responsibility; Phenomenology of agency 
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